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REMARKS

UPON

UNITED STATES INTERVENTION

IN

HAYTI,

WITH COMMENTS UPON THE

CORRESPONDENCE

CONNECTED WITH IT.

BY B. C. CLARK.

BOSTON:

1853.

EASTBURN'S PRESS.

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REMARKS

UPON UNITED STATES INTERVENTION IN HAYTI.

"T will be recorded as a precedent,
And many an error by the same example
Will rush into the State."

Since the publication of "A Plea for Hayti," the correspondence between the Haytien Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the agents of the three powers who attempted to coerce the Government of Hayti, has found its way into the columns of the American newspapers, and has been copied into some of our most distinguished journals. As a general thing, the tone of the press without regard to party, has been most unfavorable to the United States in relation to this mission, and also to the mode which was adopted for carrying out its object.

The fact that an interference like that which has been witnessed, was deemed proper by the Government of the United States, denotes a foregone conclusion on the part of the Administration highly prejudicial to the Government of Hayti; and the publication of the correspondence of R. M. Walsh, Esq., the United

States Commissioner, is calculated to justify this case of active intervention.

In alluding (in our first paper on Hayti) to the Mission appointed by the Hon. Mr. Calhoun some nine years ago, it will be perceived that we put the most liberal construction upon the doings of that great statesman. Indeed, notwithstanding the complaints which were made at the appointment of that Mission, it is quite manifest that it was induced by misrepresentation. Whether the Hon. Secretary was afterwards satisfied, that the *one hundred and thirty thousand white Dominicans* who claimed protection at the hands of the Government of the United States, were, with the exception of some three to five thousand, all "men in buckram suits," is uncertain, but to the immortal fame of that distinguished man, he did not so far as we know or believe, ever swerve from the path of manliness and honor, by seeking to disparage Hayti through the letters of his secret agent, or by advising a practical interference with her domestic relations.

The Mission of 1851 was of a vastly different character, and the writer submits that he approaches to even a brief consideration of it with great unwillingness. It is true that a great and unprovoked wrong had been inflicted upon Hayti, and that there had existed ample cause for grave complaint, but notwithstanding this, the writer considered that agitation would be productive of no good to any party, and he believes that no occasion would have been taken to enlarge upon this Mission, but for the publication of

the correspondence ; *except for* THIS, the offensive dictatorial interference (which might justly have raised a cry among the Haytiens) would have been as dead in history as it was in its influence upon the Chief of Hayti.

With a feeling of deep regret at the inconsistent position which the United States occupies in this matter, the writer submits that he would be recreant to his cause, false to his professions, and justly chargeable with having sacrificed principle to party, if he did not respond to the injurious suggestions which have grown out of this unfortunate affair.

The American Commissioner, R. M. Walsh, Esq., has been severely censured for the irrelevancy of some of his communications, and for other matters connected with the business of the Mission ; but in view of the remarkable character of the Mission, we feel much more inclined to ponder and comment upon the sentiments of the Commissioner, than we do to unite in censures at his expression of them.

It is true that many of the Commissioner's remarks to the Hon. Mr. Webster were uncalled for, and would seem to have but little connection with the object of his Mission. Indeed, the Commissioner very properly suggests, that he "*trusts the Hon. Secretary will pardon him if he sometimes wanders from the serious tone of a despatch.*" But although many of his suggestions were uncalled for, and may fairly be considered as extra-professional, yet the opinion of any intelligent gentleman who has spent a few weeks or a few months in Hayti, is deserv-

ing of respectful consideration ; and in the case of the Commissioner, it will be admitted that his remarks on Hayti are not without foundation ; for there is not a country on the face of the earth to which many of them will not apply. At the same time we think that in many important particulars, he has imbibed very erroneous impressions, and that his expressed convictions do great wrong to the Haytien character.

In relation to the “*fearful atrocities*” and “*bloody tragedies*” which the Commissioner writes about, it is our firm conviction, based upon some personal knowledge, and upon minute and extensive inquiry, that there is not one of the United States, which in proportion to its numbers, can shame Hayti by a comparison of criminal calendars for the past twenty years. We say further, that there is not in our opinion a single village in New England, in which the people are more remarkable for mildness, hospitality, and freedom from crime, than are the peasantry of Hayti ; and no part of the world in which the defenceless traveller is safer than in the mountains of St. Domingo.

The Commissioner alludes in disparaging terms to the Romish Priests of the country. Are they any worse than the Jesuits of France, Spain or Italy ? We think not, but

“Plate sin with gold,
And the strong lance of justice hurtless breaks,
Arm it in rags a pigmy straw doth pierce it.”

The Commissioner, in alluding to the condition of the Island when under the dominion of the French,

calls it an "*exulting and abounding land*," a land literally "*flowing with milk and honey*;"—that it was an "exulting and abounding land," is certainly true; it exulted in vice and abounded in cruelty, and in relation to the "milk and honey," we admit that if the "cities of the plain" were a land "flowing with milk and honey," then was St. Domingo in 1790 a truly prosperous country, and not otherwise.

A distinguished man has said, "a nation may be conquered, trodden down, her living sons in chains, her dead the prey of vultures, and still leave a bright example, a glorious history, to after times. But when folly and wickedness have ruled the hour, and disaster is the legitimate child of profligacy and crime, the page that records it is but a record of infamy, and pity for misfortune becomes a crime against justice."

Let us see how this will apply to the *colony* of St. Domingo. Rainsford, in his history of the Island, says, in allusion to colonial civilization—

"*Flushed with opulence and dissipation, the majority of the planters in St. Domingo had arrived at a state of sentiment the MOST VITIATED and MANNERS EQUALLY DEPRAVED; while, injured by an example so contagious, the slaves had become more dissolute than those of any British Island. If the master was proud, voluptuous, and crafty, the slaves were equally vicious and often riotous; the punishment of one was but the consequent of his own excess, but that of the other was often cruel and unnatural. The proprietor would bear no rival in his parish, and would not bend even to the ordinance of justice.*"

John Macgregor, the English historian, and a member of Parliament, in relation to the same subject, says—

“ The first serious symptoms of revolt, it will be observed, were not made by the slave population, but from the first interference of the National Assembly of France, and afterwards by the supporters and advocates of the people of color, and the Society of Amis des Noirs. It has astonished those who knew not the fact, THAT DURING THE DISTURBANCES WHICH HAD PREVAILED, THE SLAVE POPULATION SHOULD HAVE REMAINED PASSIVE OBSERVERS OF THE CONTEST. It may be at the same time remarked, that the landed proprietors and planters were become wealthy; their extensive plantations, with a rich and productive soil, and with a favorable climate, were in a high state of cultivation. Their manners and habits became depraved in about the same ratio as they advanced in prosperity. They are asserted to have been vain, haughty, and voluptuous, and, unlike their Spanish neighbors, they inflicted excessive punishments in exacting labor from their slaves. Their sensualities had also, it is affirmed, excited very general disgust.

“ Society had, in fact, become so depraved, THAT VICE WAS GLORIED IN. When the slaves were at length instigated to join in the revolt, it is not surprising that the untaught slave should be led by pernicious example to indulge in iniquitous and immoral practices, and in the ungovernable propensities of his master. It was, in fact, the immorality of the master which prepared the slave for the extraordinary cruelties, which they afterwards inflicted in the spirit of revenge.”

There were of course, some exceptions among the colonists ; but they were few in number—"a spot of azure in a clouded sky." Among these exceptions, Charles de Lemeth was, perhaps, the most distinguished. He was one of the largest proprietors in St. Domingo, but "*colonial civilization*" was marked by such atrocities, that he sacrificed his whole fortune to aid in its demolition. M. Bayou, Manager of the Breda Estate, was also an honorable exception to the generality of those who were in power. It will be remembered, that Toussaint was a field slave on the Breda plantation, and that as a reward for his faithfulness, M. Bayou promoted him to the place of postillion in the establishment. It has been said, that beyond this favor nothing was ever done for him by the Manager, and that he acquired knowledge and distinction by his own unaided efforts. On the other hand, there are better reasons for believing, that M. Bayou having early discovered the true character of the black, not only allowed him the use of his books, but that he actually aided him by personal instruction.

The subsequent course of Toussaint would seem to indicate the extent of his obligation to his friend. He would not, and never did join in the revolt against the whites ; and while indiscriminate extermination was the order with *both parties*, he, at the risk of his life, not only secured the Manager from all harm, but by his genius and activity, succeeded in placing him in the United States in safety. Neither station nor time seem ever to have chilled the genial current of Tous-

saint's high soul, for when he became chief of the Island, he made shipments of produce continually and to the end, to M. Bayou, who had settled in Baltimore.

Doubtless the Manager had deserved all this, and if Toussaint had done less than he did, he would have disparaged his race in their claim to grateful hearts.*

We have given the statements of the historians, Rainsford and Macgregor, in relation to what St. Domingo was when under the dominion of the French, and they are abundantly sustained by other authority, yet the Commissioner says,—“ *In proportion as the recollections and traditions of the old colonial civilization are fading away, and the imitative propensity which is so strong a characteristic of the African, is losing its opportunity of exercise, the black inhabitants are reverting to that primitive state from which they were elevated by a contact with the whites.*” We say unhesitatingly that

* We cannot refrain from calling the attention of the reader to one of the many interesting incidents connected with the sad story of the revolution. It is related by Bryan Edwards, the English Historian, in the following language, (75, 76 pp.)

Mons. and Madame Baillon, their daughter and son-in-law, and two white servants, resided on a mountain plantation about thirty miles from Cape François. They were apprised of the revolt by one of their own slaves, who was himself in the conspiracy, but promised, if possible, to save the lives of his master and his family. Having no immediate means of providing for their escape, he conducted them into an adjacent wood; after which he went and joined the revolters. The following night, he found an opportunity of bringing them provisions from the rebel camp. The second night he returned again, with a further supply of provisions; but declared that it would be out of his power to give them any further assistance. After this, they saw nothing of the negro for three days; but at the end of that time he came again, and directed the family how to make their way to a river which led to Port Margot, assuring them they would find a canoe on a part of the river which he described. They followed his directions, found the canoe, and got safely into it; but were upset by the rapidity of the current, and

the "recollections and traditions" of the old colonial civilization are replete with bloody instructions and fatal examples, and further, that one of the brightest hopes for the future of Hayti, rests upon the fact that the blacks have *not* exercised their "*imitative propensity*," in relation to the things which have been set before them—it furnishes the strongest evidence of their "innate superiority," on the score of humanity and the forgiveness of wrongs. No one can ponder the recollections of the old colonial civilization, without feelings of deep sorrow. At the same time, no one can wonder at its disastrous termination, since

"If the rulers be lewd and impious, chastisement will come upon that people.

"The bitterest scourge in a land is ungodliness in them that govern it."

The colonists of St. Domingo were not, at last, left in ignorance of the fact that their misfortunes were consequent upon their own depravity. The Commis-

after a narrow escape, thought it best to return to their retreat in the mountains. The negro, anxious for their safety, again found them out and directed them to a broader part of the river, where he assured them he had provided a boat; but said it was the last effort he could make to save them. They went accordingly, but not finding the boat, gave themselves up for lost, when the faithful negro again appeared like their guardian angel. He brought with him pigeons, poultry, and bread; and conducted the family, by slow marches, in the night, along the banks of the river, until they were within sight of the wharf at Port Margot; when telling them they were entirely out of danger, he took his leave forever, and went to join the rebels. The family were in the woods nineteen nights."

This case of attachment is remarkable, only from the fact, that there was but little incentive for it. The historian remarks that it was the more affecting on that account. It was entirely unlooked for.

We find many evidences, that at the period named, even a moderate degree of kindness towards individuals of the race, inspired feelings of gratitude so strongly marked by constancy and devotedness, that neither the dread of torture, nor the fear of death, could ever shake them.

sioner says—" *It is a conviction which has been forced upon me by what I have learned here, that negroes only cease to be children when they degenerate into savages.*"

It may be true that all of us are born "dead in trespasses and sin," but we think it will hardly be conceded that any race of beings bearing the image of God, must necessarily become savages when they cease to be children. It may be that Ethiopia will for a while stretch forth her hands in vain, and that missionary enterprise may be hindered, and individual efforts blasted by the selfish, blighting policy of civilized nations, but the sin will not rest upon *her*; *theirs* will be the guilt, *theirs* the deep damnation.

The Commissioner says, "*the whole power of the nation is lodged in the hands of the Emperor,*" yet he alleges, that the same Legislature which voted him a large sum of money for some "*absurd costume,*" refused 25,000 francs for public schools. Now it is a well known fact, that the present Government of Hayti has done all that can be done by any Government for common school education ; we have already said it has not only established schools for all, but that being aware that indolence and thoughtlessness are among the characteristics of the lower classes, it has passed stringent laws to insure the use of them. *Parents are not allowed to neglect the education of their children.*

In relation to the doings of the Legislature, it appears strange that this man, in whose hands the WHOLE POWER OF THE NATION IS LODGED, this Chief, who is the "army's idol and the council's head, whose smile is

fortune and whose will is law," should bow him to the Senate for money to pay for some "absurd cos ume."

But there is not at the worst, any thing very grave in the Commissioner's suggestion. Nations much more enlightened than Hayti, have committed greater errors than have been charged to her in relation to her appropriations. We would ask if our own history is without a parallel? Have we not seen practical illustrations by both of the great parties of the country, of the doctrine that "to the victors belong the spoils?" Have not each of these parties, in turn, truthfully charged the other with almost every conceivable species of political scoundrelism and depravity? Is it not true that on one occasion, consequent upon the astounding defalcations of the office-holders, the Secretary of the Treasury was compelled to recommend retrenchment, and that PENSIONS, HARBORS and LIGHT-HOUSES, were named as the subjects of it? Does any one forget that when this last matter was brought up in Congress, a member in his place said, in substance, (we quote from memory)—"And what do you suppose, Mr. Chairman, are to be the subjects of this new and sudden economy? Look into the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, and you will find out. Well, Sir, what are they? Pensions, harbors and light-houses. First of all, the scarred veterans of the revolution are to be deprived of a portion of the small pittance doled out to them by the country. How many of them will you have to send forth as beggars on the very soil which they wrenched

from the hand of tyranny? How many harbors will it take—those nests of commerce to which the canvas-winged birds of the ocean fly for safety? How many light-houses will it take—how many of those bright eyes of the ocean are to be put out? How many of those faithful sentinels who stand along our rocky coast to give timely notice to the mariner when the lee shore threatens—how many of these, I ask, are to be discharged from their humane service? Sir, my blood boils at the cold-blooded atrocity with which this Administration proposes thus to sacrifice the very family jewels of the country, to pay for the consequences of its own profligacy.”

We allude to this particular complaint for no political object, but simply because the plundering of the Treasury at that particular moment was fraught with memorable consequences. We do not admit for a moment that the cases alluded to are isolated—on the contrary, partisan services have at different periods been lavishly rewarded, and this, too, while the honest claims of citizens upon the Government have been fraudulently denied. The French and Spanish claims are of this class.

Now if such interests as those which have been named, have been jeopardized through the “*profligacy*” of the Government of the United States, surely no subsequent Administration ought to reflect very severely upon Hayti for not expending all her means on schools, especially when, if it be true, that NEGROES ONLY
CEASE TO BE CHILDREN WHEN THEY BECOME SAV-

AGES, learning would only hasten their degeneracy into barbarism.

The Commissioner suggests that the influences of religion, of literature, of science, and of art, do not exert the least practical sway on Hayti. Without questioning the general correctness of his conviction in this particular, we ask what practical sway is exerted by religion, literature, or science, in any one of the Republics of South America, that is not felt in Hayti? There must, after all, be some standard by which we are to test the claims of Hayti to the respectful consideration of the United States, and the fairest way of determining the question would seem to be by a comparison of her course and present position with those of other young nations, who in their relations with us stand upon an equality with England and France. The Republics of South America are of this class; they have enjoyed the recognition and the friendship of the Government of the United States for more than thirty years. It will not be questioned that this friendly recognition gave them great confidence and strength, nor will it be denied that they had at the commencement of their career, and have now, more intelligence than the Haytiens in general ever possessed. Now we ask how is it with them today as independent countries? Why, not a breeze sweeps from the South that does not echo with the clash of resounding arms, and tell of anarchy, confusion, and bloodshed.

Faction has risen upon faction continually for many years, and the sad consequences of civil discord have

been witnessed by surrounding nations. "*Fearful atrocities*" and "*bloody tragedies*" are ever the attendants upon fierce civil war, but these governments have been left to manage their own affairs in their own way, and it is quite certain that foreign interference would no more settle the points upon which they differ, or subserve the cause of humanity, than would foreign intervention affect favorably the system of slavery in the United States.

No one will deny that the Republics of South America have been, since the day of their existence, vastly more unfortunate in relation to internal dissensions, "*fearful atrocities*," and "*bloody tragedies*," than Hayti has been during the same period; but no one asks or desires that they shall be blotted out from the Map of Nations. No public agent of humanity is sent to either of these countries,—no Commissioner writes in relation to them, that their "*destruction can scarcely be considered a cause of grief, and their epitaph will have no claim to be written with a pen dipped in tears*;" and yet this is the sentiment communicated by the Commissioner to the Hon. Secretary of State, in relation to Hayti, and the communication is published throughout the United States.

It is both natural and proper to inquire how it is that from among some five or six feeble Powers, Hayti alone—the only Government among them not recognized by the United States, is found to be a fit subject for intervention.

It is perfectly well remembered that the Government

of the United States, in the exercise of what appeared to be an inflexible, unyielding, cast-iron integrity, declined to consider for a moment the eloquent appeals of the Hungarian Chief in behalf of his people, and that the course of the Government was justified by the most distinguished men of the country. Non-intervention was applauded to the very echo that did applaud again, and the grounds upon which it was defended, were both popular and numerous. Some politicians argued that we had nothing to do with considerations of humanity, others expressed contempt for that "manifest destiny" which had been urged as a plea for intermeddling with the affairs of other nations; others, again, declared that men and nations made their own destinies, and that they had seen no manifestation of the Divine Will, which called upon the United States to perform missionary duty. Some there were who entertained serious doubts as to embroiling the country in a war with Russia. How far the Government of the United States was impelled in its action by a consideration of the last suggestion, cannot perhaps be determined, but it is certain that at the very moment when non-intervention was pronounced to be a vital principle with us, founded no less in policy than justice, the Government of the United States was going hand in hand with two great Powers, (who, as nations, "know no touch of pity,") upon the poor business of intervention with a weak but friendly power.

That this interference, so far as the Government of the United States was concerned, was uncalled for and

entirely inconsistent with its professions, is perfectly manifest, and by the light of recent developments, it will be clearly seen that it has, in more than one particular, placed the country in a false and most unfortunate position. A late number of the *Courier d'Havre* promulgates the fact, that as far back as 1843, the Dominicans, the nullifiers of the Spanish part of St. Domingo, received a pledge from France that she would render to them, "*efficient assistance both to conquer and to maintain their absolute independence.*" As a return for the promise of this unqualified protectorate, the Dominicans ceded to France the peninsula of Samana to found a permanent establishment.

It will be remembered that the Bay of Samana is one of the finest and most valuable among all the bays in the West Indies. It commands the Mona passage. It is capacious enough to hold the ships of the whole world; it is free from the hurricanes which are often experienced in the neighboring islands; and it is not easy to estimate its importance to nations interested in the trade of South America and the West Indies. And yet this same Havre journal says the negotiations which led to this result, "*were long and difficult.*" Why were they long and difficult? Samana was a rich prize. *Why* was there any hesitation on the part of the French? Simply because the act was one of gross outrage on the rights of Hayti, and was calculated, if promulgated, to excite the indignation of other countries. Hayti, the French knew, might not be able to avenge the wrong, but the United States, although

not friendly to Hayti, might be unwilling to see a protectorate of such a character established in this hemisphere, and in a place of so much importance to her commercial interests. Therefore it was that the negotiations were "long and difficult."

Within a year after the demi-ratification of the treaty which secured to France an important territory belonging to the Government of Hayti, the party of the "exceeding high mountain" claimed from France protection against the consequences of their rebellion. The French king was willing to aid them, and did aid them by the *presence* of his West India squadron, but he hesitated to fulfil the other and more important part of the treaty. However, this formidable show of protection appears to have succeeded, for the Dominican chief immediately *proclaimed the independence of Dominica*. This done, he called upon France to instal at Samana, the "*efficient protectorate*" agreed upon in the treaty of 1843. The French king listened to this call with about as little satisfaction as a Dutchman would probably exhibit if compelled to light his pipe by the tongue of a salamander. At length, for very obvious reasons, King Louis Phillippe deemed it wise to let "I dare not, wait upon I would," and the "efficient protectorate" was *not* established in accordance with the treaty of 1843.

Enough, however, had been done by the French for all injurious purposes affecting the rights of the Government of Hayti. The fears entertained by the French in regard to the consequences of this enter-

prise, are sufficiently indicated by the "Courier d' Havre" itself, which says in relation to the demand of the Dominican chief for the fulfilment of the treaty—
"But neither arguments nor entreaties, nor even the threat of throwing himself into the arms of another power, could overcome the repugnance of King Louis Phillippe for a step which might result in DIPLOMATIC COMPLICATIONS."

From what has appeared in the French journals, and from the pains taken to prepare the United States for the full exercise of a French protectorate in Dominica, it is probable that Napoleon III. has none of that repugnance to "DIPLOMATIC COMPLICATIONS," which was so distinctly manifested by King Louis Phillippe, but that France, whenever it may suit her purpose, will be found in the occupancy of Samana. Thus it is seen that, some eight years after the establishment of this mongrel and fear and trembling protectorate, the United States are found acting in concert with France against the Government of Hayti, whose territory had been wrongfully taken and appropriated to the use of this (now) dangerous European power.

The possession of Cuba, or of its most commanding bay, by the British Government, would involve no principle more important to this country, than does the ownership of Samana by the French. And yet it is seen that the United States have volunteered to act as protector to this French protectorate.

The motive of France in her late movement, would appear to be plain enough, and the policy of England

equally clear ; her plea, like that of France, for intervention, was humanity, but her humanity in this connection was about as substantial, and almost as transparent, as are the living skeletons of her coolies in Jamaica.

England, always clever in the science of political economy, was never stronger in that way than now ; the old Lion's paw was never more elastic than at this moment—there appears to be no hole too small for it.

It has been said that the first question England now asks is, “ whether the thing will pay.” It is precisely so, and if it be true that Sir Robert Peel, the most brilliant statesman of England, felt it incumbent upon himself to speak for a considerable time upon the quality of the onion seed, and of how much revenue it would probably yield to the Government, we may feel quite sure that his successor is not dead to the fact that this country is fast monopolising an extensive trade with Hayti, of which she for many years had the lion's share.

In uniting with France and England in an offensive interference with the affairs of Hayti, an independent and friendly State, it is quite apparent that the Government of the United States were pulling nuts out of the fire, solely for the benefit of the other interventionists. This intervention on the part of this country would have been attended with highly injurious consequences to our trade, but that the Haytiens were aware of the grasping character of the commercial policy of England, and were also made to understand that

there existed in the United States a great but honest misapprehension in regard to their position, their character, and their intentions.

Unfortunate and inconsistent as this case of intervention appears to be in the eyes of the country, there are bearing upon it complaints, other than those which are based upon the palpable violation of the time-honored policy of Washington. But it would subserve no good purpose to consider them now. It may, however, be proper to call the attention of the reader, to the manner in which the three great Powers approached the Government of Hayti. Sir Henry Bulwer, at Washington, in his orders to the British Consul at Port au Prince, writes—“ *You will take care to make any menace of force in such vague terms, as would not actually compromise Her Majesty's Government to employ force, until it shall have learned from you what species of force would be necessary, in order to arrive at the results which you deem that a blockade would not be sufficient to obtain.*” The Government of the United States, with a knowledge of these instructions, “ *entirely concurs with them,*” and expects its agents will “ *be governed by them.*”

In accordance with this very unhappy specimen of diplomacy, the three agents SOLEMNLY AND OFFICIALLY AFFIRMED that Great Britain, France and the United States had “determined” that Hayti should grant a peace, or at least a ten years' truce, to St. Domingo, and declared that it would be at her peril if she refused to act according to that determination. Hayti did refuse,

and this great union of demonstration utterly failed in its object. The determination and the threat of the three great Powers went for nothing.

In this connection, we submit that the Government of the United States in joining this crusade, was uniting against a chief with whom it had no diplomatic relations, and of whom it knew nothing except from *ex parte* representations. These representations, as we have before said, were in the main mere illusions; the war of color and the 130,000 white Dominicans were springs to entrap the unwary—pious frauds.

Intervention, and even coercion, might certainly be both humane and proper, if exercised towards a horde of acknowledged cannibals or barbarians. But we think that irrespective of any consideration of that homage which the United States professes to pay to the principle of non-intervention, there is neither justice nor policy in exercising dictatorial “interference” and menacing language towards an orderly, independent and friendly State; and especially against a Government which, in relation to one important point, religious toleration, (vital to the highest good of a people,) had shown itself superior to some of the most refined and polished nations of Europe.

It is well known that as soon as Hayti proclaimed religious toleration, some of her citizens went (conscientiously no doubt) for a “*higher law*,” and seceded. Perhaps they ought not to be impugned for this, but certainly they can have on that score no claim to the sympathy of the people of the United States, and it was

obviously unfair for them to urge other excuses as the main causes for secession.

In abandoning the legitimate Government, they assumed precisely what one of the United States would assume, if it should rebel against the Union, because the Federal Government had declined to accede to its demand for the adoption of a particular creed, to the exclusion of all other shades of belief and forms of worship. Let us suppose for a moment that the State of New York should secede from this Union because the general Government had refused her claim to the "SOLE RIGHT" throughout this country, of the Roman Catholic religion. Here we have a parallel so far as it goes, and novel enough would such a case appear. Its strangeness, however, would be increased, if from her isolated position, the seceding State could not at once be reclaimed by the Federal Government, and some foreign Power should deny the authority of the Union over its wandering star. Such an interference would doubtless be considered by the people of the United States as very grievous. This figure, however, fails to illustrate the case—to find a parallel, we must imagine the interposing party to be a powerful nation, with twenty times our population, intelligent in proportion to its numbers, with a people brave, energetic, enterprising, humane, tolerant and prosperous beyond example. We must feel that while this great nation had sought, acknowledged, and cherished humble acquaintances in Southern seas and Northern latitudes, it had manifested less interest in us, than it had in the sound-

ings of the Dead Sea ; that in brief, it had never recognized even our existence as a nation.

We must imagine the influences consequent upon treatment so injurious and degrading to our country. We must suppose that we had, after pondering our humiliating position induced by the concentrated neglect, contumely and contempt of forty years, considered ourselves at least safe from any hurtful contact with this great nation. And then, to approach a parallel, we must imagine that while the just pride of our country was humbled and festering in that ignoble security which its insignificance alone had commanded, our Department of State is called upon by an agent of this great Power, backed by a huge war steamer at anchor under the windows of the Capitol, to listen to the solemn declaration of this great Power, that it would be at the peril of the United States, if she did not submit to the wishes of the nullifying State—or in other words, if she did not abandon that cherished principle of religious toleration, which the great Power itself had, from its earliest infancy, most nobly defended.

Here we have an idea of the position in which Hayti (a country whose sovereignty is acknowledged by the most powerful nations of the earth) was placed by intervention. It has, however, been seen that she maintained herself like a Queen, and that vain menaces, vague threats, the blockade, and the solemn declarations of the three great Dictators, fell like snow-flakes on the sea. But the consciousness of right does not always

shield either a small nation, or an humble man, from injury at the hands of the powerful. With less firmness or less ability than the chief of Hayti displayed, consequences fatal to the increasing prosperity of his country, would have been witnessed.

The Government of the United States has deemed it not inconsistent with the public interest, that the speculations of its Commissioner should be placed before the country. Many of his suggestions are calculated, if not designed, to justify in some degree this unparalleled case of intervention; some of the most important of them are entirely gratuitous, but we will not object to them on that account, nor complain of the manner in which they have been promulgated. If the Commissioner's convictions are well founded, no lover of truth will cavil at the manner in which they have been made known, and we cheerfully submit that if his ideas of a "*land flowing with milk and honey*" are just, if his complaint, that the blacks have failed to exercise their "*imitative propensity*" in regard to the examples of colonial civilization, is founded in wisdom; if, in brief, it be really true, that "*negroes only cease to be children when they become savages,*" then have our hopes for Hayti been like "the baseless fabric of a vision," and we will take our place among rainbow theorists and Utopian dreamers. But we believe that enough has been said and proved, to show conclusively that in the matter of self-government as well as in all other material points, the Haytiens stand first among the young nations which have been named. In relation to

diplomatic ability, we refer with peculiar satisfaction (so far as Hayti is concerned) to the Haytien Minister's correspondence with the agents of the three Powers. His letters are singularly proper. The SOLEMN DECLARATION OF THE DETERMINATION OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED STATES, failed to "fright the Isle from her propriety." The MINISTER did not have recourse to "*vague terms*;" his reply was manly, and liable to no misconstruction; his letters are before the world, and they will fill a bright and honorable page in the history of his country.

In conclusion, we will turn for one moment to a consideration of those in the young Nations which have been named, who do not mingle with the business of Government. How do the representatives of the commercial interests of these different powers compare with each other? We will not disparage those of the Republics, but we say that in no country in the world is there a higher standard of commercial integrity, or a more scrupulous regard for the laws of reposed confidence than will be found among the Haytien and foreign merchants in the sea port towns of Hayti.

In regard to the masses, those who are engaged in rural occupations, the people of the interior—How, we ask, is it with them? Is the cultivator of South America more industrious, more honest, more hospitable than the Haytien peasant? We have seen them both, and we answer, No.

In relation to the products of Hayti, the Commissioner quotes the language of a foreigner who had been

in the Island for a long time. "When I arrived here, (said the foreigner,) there was abundance of every thing; now, there is a want of every thing."*

It is of course true that the capabilities of St. Domingo have not been taxed to their utmost limit. The resources of such countries never are fully developed by voluntary labor. But notwithstanding the Commissioner's suggestions in regard to the absence of salutary influences in Hayti, we think results will prove that there exist among the Haytiens, incentives to labor not common among mere *children* or *savages*.

Upon an examination of the statistics, it will be found that her commerce is quite large, exceedingly large for such a people as the Commissioner pictures. Her trade with the United States alone, is equal to that of VENEZUELA, BOLIVIA, THE ARGENTINE AND CISAPLATINE REPUBLICS AND PERU ALTOGETHER; it will also be found that MEXICO, with a population of eight millions, (*sixteen times larger than that of Hayti,*) took from the United States in 1851, \$330,000 less than Hayti, and employed 26,000 tons less of our shipping. In the year ending December, 1852, no less than 330 cargoes were exchanged between Hayti and the *single*

* It may be that this individual was not unlike the Truro man, who, having no taste for "the romance of the sea," abandoned the sandy shores of Cape Cod, for a fertile spot in the West, where for many years he exercised "a masterly inactivity." In reply to the inquiry of a New Englander who chanced that way, as to his success, &c., he said, "when I came to this part of the country, I had not a rag to my back, now I am covered with rags"

It is needless to remark that there are always some persons, of a certain class, in every country, who, in the midst of plenty, are continually experiencing a "*want of every thing.*"

port of Boston. It is an error then to suppose that there is a "want of every thing" in Hayti, or that there is less industry among the blacks of that country than in any other class of freemen living within the tropics. There cannot possibly be a "want of every thing" in a country whose commerce is so respectable in point of extent.

Now, although Hayti has been better governed, and has evinced more zeal in her industrial pursuits during the last thirty years than any one of the Republics of South America, yet it is freely admitted that she does not occupy the place which all Christian people would rejoice to see her fill. If it were otherwise, neither the friendly recognition of the United States, nor the exercise of any other means for her advancement, would be required.

That she has in turn suffered from the bad examples, cruelty, neglect, cupidity and interference of other nations is beyond all doubt, and consequent upon a knowledge of this truth, is the wide-spread sympathy which has been manifested for her of late. If the lone traveller had not fallen among thieves, the Samaritan would not have stopped by the way-side.

The foregoing suggestions were all we intended to offer in relation to this subject, but since closing them, the PRIVATE instructions of the Hon. Secretary of State to Mr. Walsh, have been placed before the country, and it will be seen that they have an important bearing on this matter.

We remarked at the opening of the preceding notes, that the action of the Government of the United States denoted a "*foregone conclusion unfavorable to Hayti*," but it was not until this late moment, that the *grounds* for this conclusion were visible. It will now be made manifest to those who have felt interest enough in the subject, to read what has lately been written in relation to it, that the Mission of Mr. Walsh was founded upon the grossest misapprehension on the part of the Hon. Secretary of State. A recurrence to two points in his private instructions will make this clear. The Hon. Secretary writes to the Commissioner as follows:—"The mode of warfare adopted by the Haytiens, impelled as they have been on former occasions, not by the lust of dominion only, but by their savage antipathy to a different race, is shocking to humanity." Again he writes to the Commissioner, "*the Dominicans have shown much gallantry in expelling the Haytiens in 1844, in repulsing the attempt to re-subjugate them.*"

First, in regard to the antipathy of the Haytiens towards a "different race"—there is not now and has

never been a war of caste in Hayti since the day of her independence, and in relation to the "RE-SUBJUGATION" of the Dominicans, the thing was impossible, since they had never been subjugated. That the people of the Spanish part did not secede from the Government of Hayti, from any considerations pertaining to color, is seen in the fact that Herard, who was President of Hayti at that time, was himself a mulatto, and that there was not on his part the slightest denotement of hostility, much less a war of extermination.

It will also be found that the most distinguished Dominican chiefs were mulattoes, and that it was not till after General Baez (a mulatto, *then* a representative from the Spanish part, and *now* President of Dominica) had signed the Constitution fixed upon in solemn convention by the representatives of Hayti, that he deserted the legitimate Government. It will further be seen that the incentives held forth to the United States for intervention were mere illusions—instead of having, as was represented, a population of 200,000, they had not one half that number, and of the 130,000 whites claimed for Dominica, not more than 5000, and probably not more than 3000 could be found in the whole Spanish part; yet the Hon. Secretary, with impressions widely different, writes to Mr. Walsh in relation to the antipathy of the Haytiens to a "*different race*." A writer whose extensive opportunities for observation entitle his statements to great respect, says in an article on Hayti—" *Dominica is not white. There are comparatively very few whites there. Nearly if not all the in-*

habitants have negro blood in their veins, and in the United States would not even be respectable.” Baez, the President, is a mulatto.

Indeed, we are reliably informed from a gentleman who was on the spot at the time, that one of the reasons for rejecting Mr. Duff Green’s famous plan for American colonization, was the knowledge that white Americans were prejudiced against color, and would look down upon the natives as “niggers.”

In 1796, Moreau St. Mery, the best writer on the country, speaks of entire villages as populated by negroes. Bryan Edwards, who wrote in 1801, says that not 3000 of the population were whites ; and it is notorious that a great proportion of those left in 1822, when Boyer annexed the country. A writer in the American Review (March, 1849) speaks of “far the greater majority as varying from dark mulatto to yellow. It is then a mistake to speak of Dominica as anything but a mulatto republic, and any sympathy awakened for it on the negrophobia principle is a sheer loss.”

In relation to the character and origin of the union between the Haytiens and the Dominicans, we have already said what we now re-affirm, that the people of the Spanish part of St. Domingo were not the victims of a forced or even a reluctant annexation. On the contrary, they sought a union with the Haytiens, and joyfully united with them under the rule of Boyer. In addition to the testimony given by the historian Brown on this point, we find in a later work, the following :—
“*In 1821, both the Spanish and French parts of the*

Island were united under Boyer, and for twenty-two years they remained together without difficulty. After Boyer had left the Government and the Island, a Convention was held to form a new Constitution; this was finally completed and published on December 30, 1843. This Constitution, following the example of the United States, guaranteed liberty and equal rights to all denominations of religion. To the Spanish prejudices of the Eastern part, this was an intolerable thing, and when the article was adopted, several deputies from that section rose and withdrew from the Convention. They were intolerant Catholics, and would not consent to admit other professions to equal privileges. Accordingly, on the 16th of January following, the Dominicans published their manifesto, declaring themselves separate from and independent of Hayti."

Another statement in relation to the affairs of Hayti at that period, contains the following:—"The Constitution they (the Haytiens) made, provided for perfect tolerance of all religious denominations; that clause was opposed before it passed, and after it had passed, several deputies from the East left the Convention. Still, several other deputies remained and attached their names to the Constitution, as it was proclaimed. Among them was Bacz, now President of the Dominican Republic. They went home, and soon after seceded, and set up that republic."

The "Revue des Deux Mondes," says—"The introduction into the Haytien Constitution, of equal rights for all forms of worship, set the insurrection on foot. From

the moment of the establishment of religious equality, all the Districts in the Eastern (Dominican) part, prepared for the insurrection."

We submit that in following the example of the United States, in relation to religious toleration, Hayti evinced an amount of wisdom which has not yet been reached by some nations who maintain a high position in the scale of civilization.

Under these circumstances, if the Government had succumbed to the demands of a faction of intolerant Catholics, or to the demands of *any other* faction claiming to brand and to punish as heretics, those who could not conscientiously adopt their creed, it would have had much less claim than it now has, to the respect and kindly consideration of the friends of religious liberty in the United States.

It is quite apparent that it was in the absence of a knowledge of the facts which are here stated, that the Hon. Secretary wrote to Mr. Walsh concerning the antipathy of the Haytiens to a "different race," and in relation to the *re-subjugation* of the Dominicans.

The fact that the private instructions of the Hon. Secretary were not published with the other part of the correspondence, nor promulgated *at all* by the Government of the United States, indicates that the Administration had discovered that the expressions used were misapplied, and that there were really no just grounds for denouncing the Haytiens as a people aiming at the "*re-subjugation*" and slaughter of a "different race."

So far as relates to the Hon. Mr. Webster, we are

satisfied that *he* had arrived at this conclusion; for in an incidental but free conversation which the writer had with him (about three months before his death, and fifteen months after the close of the Mission) on the subject of Hayti, he gave no denotement of any unfavorable impressions in regard to the Haytien character. He spoke of the Emperor Souloque, (as he called him,) in no other terms than those of respect. He listened with marked attention to several explanations which were earnestly submitted to him, and when assured that the grave charge of massacre by the Haytiens in 1848 was without foundation in truth—that there was no more of a massacre than would be seen in the streets of Boston, if the execution of the fugitive slave law should be forcibly opposed—that in brief, the least possible amount of blood was shed that could be, consistently with the restoration of order, he replied with apparent satisfaction—"I HAVE HEARD THAT ON THAT DAY THE HAYTIEN SOLDIERS AIMED TO MISS."

In relation to the Memorial to Congress for the recognition of Hayti, Mr. Webster expressed unqualified approbation of the course which had been taken.

Under these circumstances the writer submits that in preparing the first pamphlet on Hayti, he deemed it inexpedient to make any allusion to this unfortunate Mission. He did not decline to notice it because he supposed that any doubt existed, as to the fact that the movement conflicted with a principle, founded, as the distinguished men of the nation have declared, "no less in justice than policy;" he did not believe, and he

trusts that he has shown that he had no reason to believe, that the Administration still entertained a conviction that Hayti was far enough removed from the pale of civilization to justify intervention on any score, much less on the score of humanity. He does not now believe that the Government entertained this fallacy, except for a very brief period, for it is obvious that either the barbarous characteristics and the terrible designs of the chief of Hayti were found to be phantoms, or the great Powers were most unworthy champions in the cause of humanity.

The Mission, after a fitful, feverish existence of a few months, had expired—it had breathed its last, and although its “epitaph had no claim to be written with a pen dipped in tears,” yet there was after all, no disposition manifested in any quarter, to abuse its memory on the score of intentional wrong; and, as we have said before, except for the publication of the correspondence, it would have remained quietly in-urned forever—it would have slept the sleep which knows no waking.

In conclusion, the best that can be said of this movement, so far as the United States was concerned, is, that it was a great mistake, and from what has transpired since the first *partial* exhibition of the correspondence, and from other circumstances, (which it may never be necessary to allude to more particularly,) it may be considered certain, that the magnitude of the mistake will never be lessened by any attempt to change its character.



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